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ELECTIONS 2000 - The Beginning of the End
Miroljub Labus
Any attempt at prognoses on electoral outcomes in Serbia is problematic. Previous efforts by public opinion survey
agencies and political analysts have often faltered. Nevertheless, the political victory of Vojislav Koätunica is now indis-
putable, though the ruling regime is likely to maintain control in the Federal Assembly. The situation at the local level will
be completely variegated. Elections will not be the end of the current regime, but will contribute to its further deterioration.
Serbian public opinion demonstrates a clear positive and rising trend in favor of Vojislav Koätunica. While
public opinion surveys always carry margins of error and are subject to methodological flaws, all professional sur-
veys consistently indicate that, at this moment, Slobodan Miloäevi is losing the race for the presidency of the
FRY. Other candidates stand no chance at all. This is enough to conclude that Vojislav Koätunica is the political
winner of these elections. His mighty opponent has never before been in such a position, even when he was
competing with Milan Pani, the former Prime Minister. 
Naturally, this does not assume that presidential elections are an accomplished fact. Many factors will influ-
ence the final result. Just to mention a few: voter turnout, electoral fraud, policy of the international communi-
ty, quarrels in the opposition ranks, etc. The greater the voter turnout, the lesser the electoral fraud, the more
discreet the international community, the smaller the disputes within the opposition - the greater the chances of
Vojislav Koätunica. Even so, Vojislav KoätunicaÕs chances are so great that Slobodan Miloäevi was definitely
wrong to call early presidential elections.
a) G17 estimate based on official information from the Federal Statistics Office
b)  The unemployment rate for VI 2000 is 27.5% in Serbia, 40.2% in Montenegro, & 28.5% in FRY
FRY Basic Economic Indicators 1999 1999 VII 2000 VII 2000 VII 2000 I-VII 2000
1998 VI 2000 VII 1999 I-VII 1999
GDP - USD million 14,224a) -19.3% É É É É
Montenegro É É É É É É
Serbia É É É É É É
GDP per capita - USD 1,699a) -19.1% É É É É
Montenegro É É É É É É
Serbia É É É É É É
Central Serbia É É É É É É
Vojvodina É É É É É É
Industrial Production É -24.1% É -5.3% 24.3% 20.0%
Montenegro É -7.6% É 14.4% 14.6% 1.0%
Serbia É -25.6% É -6.5% 25.4% 21.8%
Central Serbia É -24.5% É -3.2% 25.1% 24.2%
Vojvodina É -28.2% É -13.8% 26.1% 16.4%
Average Wage - DM 107 -31.7% É É É É
Montenegro 154 -14.1% 191 1.1% 16.2% 9.1%
Serbia 102 -33.8% 93 2.3% -8.1% -23.8%
Unemployment Rateb) 27.3% 8.3% É É É É
Montenegro 36.8% 7.9% É É É É
Serbia 26.5% 8.2% É É É É
Export - USD million 1,498 -46.9% 151 -5.7% 20.6% 15.6%
Montenegro 123 -4.7% 15 -14.0% 62.9% 51.6%
Serbia 1,375 -48.9% 136 -4.7% 17.3% 12.3%
Import - USD million 3,296 -30.3% 242 -22.6% -6.2% 31.4%
Montenegro 358 6.9% 20 -30.2% -32.5% 1.9%
Serbia 2,938 -33.2% 223 -21.8% -2.8% 35.7%
Monetary supply (M1), end of period, DIN billion 16.4 51.9% 22.5 2.3% 69.1% 56.0%
Cash 6.7 34.0% 8.0 6.7% 48.6% 29.9%
Deposits 9.7 67.2% 14.5 0.0% 83.0% 74.7%
Real money supply, end of period, DM million 739 -42.3% 838 1.6% -24.8% -37.6%
Market exchange rate, monthly level 4.25% -38.8% 6.33% 8.6% 187.7% 24.1%
Retail prices É 42.4% É 2.9% 68.4% 58.7%
Montenegro É 60.1% É 2.0% 157.1% 141.6%
Serbia É 41.1% É 2.9% 62.7% 53.4%
Cost of living É 44.9% É 2.9% 76.0% 66.2%
Montenegro É 67.2% É 1.3% 163.3% 151.2%
Serbia É 43.5% É 3.2% 70.2% 60.0%
Industrial prices É 44.2% É É É É
Montenegro É 63.7% É É É É
Serbia É 43.2% É É É É
Black market exchange rate (din/DM) 12.6 88.1% 23.7 2.8% 109.8% 124.9%
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An important link
to peaceful 
transition
What was the regime thinking?
Why, then, were early presidential elections scheduled? According to one theory the answer is in the very
nature of Slobodan Miloäevi. The opposition questioned his authority and made him very nervous. He then
accepted a challenge and replied to the opposition - you wanted early elections, you will have them, but with
a much more serious opponent. Indeed, the regime did everything to secure its victory in federal elections by
amending the constitution and electoral laws so as to enable it to control presidential elections. Under a second
theory, the government monitors everyone, but monitors its members the most. It is aware of the dissatisfaction
within the Socialist Party (SPS), jointly pressed by the Radical Party (SRS) and the Yugoslav Left (JUL). As the
SPS can no longer count on the unlimited loyalty of its members, it was necessary to opt for a direct election
of the president of the FRY. A third theory argues that the regime did all it could to divide the opposition so
that it entered the elections with two lists. This is an ideal position for the SPS, still the strongest single politi-
cal party. As such, tying presidential to federal elections should have secured the re-election of the hitherto pres-
ident with the slightest of risks. A fourth theory claims that it is a miscalculation. Nobody in the ruling coalition
believed an opponent would arise that could offer a credible political alternative to the current president of the
FRY. If there is no alternative, the risk is minimal. A fifth theory asserts that Slobodan Miloäevi wants to con-
vey a message to the international community - both to that part he is in conflict with and to that one he expects
support from. He hopes to project that he is the sole representative of Yugoslavia to enjoy popular support, and
that sooner or later the international community has to accept this reality, despite the indictment of the Hague
Tribunal and the Montenegrin authorities’ protests. Hence, there are many theories and very few facts. But even
those few facts prove that Slobodan Miloäevi is likely to lose his office.
Is this a reason for panic in the ruling coalition? Not yet. It has already managed to secure around 50
seats in the lower Chamber of Citizens of the Federal Assembly, toward the 70 seats required for a majori-
ty. It has also gained control in the upper Chamber of Republics. This is a consequence of the boycott of
elections by the ruling coalition in Montenegro and the inclusion of fictional Serbian and Albanian votes from
Kosovo (which could also be dispatched by mail). Even in the case of a drastic defeat of the regime in
Vojvodina and Serbia proper, there still remains the delusion that the majority in the Federal Assembly is pre-
served. On the other hand, two opposition lists at local elections dramatically reduce the democratic oppo-
sition’s prospects of remaining in power in the towns and municipalities it now holds. If the voter turnout
does not exceed 70 per cent, there will certainly be a second round of elections for the president of the FRY.
In that case the ruling coalition can look for an opportunity in election fatigue among the opposition vot-
ers. However, if the voters’ response remains high in the second round, Vojislav Koätunica will be elected
the new president of the FRY. The ruling coalition will then be panic-stricken. This would be an important
step towards changing the whole system of power in Serbia.
Presidential elections, therefore, depend on voters’ motivation for going to elections, as the majority of
citizens would be pleased to vote against the existing president of the FRY. On the other hand, the situation
with federal parliamentary elections is completely different. The election of the federal parliament is based
upon manipulation that gives the regime an incomparable advantage. The opposition is certainly aware of
this fact, but is likely participating so as to avoid any confusion within the electorate. The fate of local elec-
tions is still undecided. If the opposition succeeds in forming a sort of coalition at the last moment, includ-
ing a technical one, i.e. if it does not compete mutually, then there will be no major changes. If not, one
should be prepared for great surprises. 
In any case, these elections will serve as an important link in a peaceful transition of power, but they will
not be fatal to the regime, as is often claimed by the press. Of course, the prospects of the country will appear
much better should democracy win, but it is important to know that even if these elections end in a tie, they
will contribute towards a final victory - at the next republican elections.
Two halves to electoral victory
It would be unwise for the results of these elections to be judged only by emotions and the orientation
of political parties. Great and unrealistic expectations always trigger huge disappointment and apathy after
elections. This used to be a vital mechanism for the continuance of the regime and the creation of an impres-
sion that it is irreplaceable. It is important to recognize that this is an electoral game consisting of a first and
a second half. The prospects of winning in the first half are both great and realistic. The victory of Vojislav
Koätunica is quite possible. We should not forget that in the accepted electoral system his opponent has a
huge advantage. However, the final result depends on whether the DOS (Democratic Opposition of Serbia)
and the SPO (Serbian Renewal Movement) will manage to find common ground at the local elections in the
last moment. A majority of the SPOÕs local organizations are not corrupted and do not support the collabo-
ration of the party’s elite with the regime. This fact should be taken into account to form a winning coalition
for local elections.
What can the international community do? The best thing would be to do nothing during the next month
or so! The worst thing it could do would be to oust Yugoslavia from the UN or to engage in forceful attempts
at arresting someone from the list of those indicted for war crimes (recall the case of Krajiänik’s arrest just prior
to elections in Republika Srpska). With pompous media coverage of the opening the Varadin bridge and the
ordered visit of the Russian Patriarch on the very eve of elections, this would further strengthen patriotic senti-
ments and voters’ hostility towards the international community. Moreover, it would alter the main theme of the
elections - a referendum against Miloäevi. Not much wisdom is required to assume that the regime would use
this opportunity for the benefit of its propaganda about the country’s defense, national consciousness and the
opposition’s betrayal. If the international community is not ready to undertake any positive measure in the inter-
est of the citizens of Serbia, it can easily wait another month. There is always plenty of time for bad news.
Formal and political winners at these elections need not be the same. It is quite certain that there will be
great electoral fraud in Montenegro and Kosovo. In an extreme case such fraud can reach a million votes, which
makes over 15 per cent of the electorate. Electoral fraud will probably not reach such dramatic proportions. Yet,
one should count on the theft of 5-10 per cent. Thus, monitoring of the elections and massive voter turnout are
necessary to neutralize this effect. On the other hand, the opposition in Serbia must react politically and even
now begin to think about next yearÕs elections for the Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, wherein the real
power rests. It should acknowledge the results of these elections only on the basis of the political will of the
electorate in Vojvodina and Serbia proper. Anything else is unimportant for a change of power in Serbia.
Voter turnout will
determine elections
Two lists threaten
opposition 
governments in
municipalities
The international
community can
help the most by
doing nothing
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Sustainable price
stabilization
A Program for Fiscal Reform
Quick or Sustainable Stabilization?
In the last decade we had two hyperinflations and two stabilization programs. Both of them (Ante Markovi
in 1990 and Dragoslav Avramovi in 1994) focused on quick, but unsustainable stabilization. Hence, they were
relatively successful on their own terms. Both programs resulted in the stabilization of prices, but soon afterwards
market instability and inflation returned.
It might have been impossible to achieve permanent stabilization, taking into account the unfavourable polit-
ical climate. We assume that a new reformist government would be formed on the basis of a new political envi-
ronment and that it will not face that element of the problem. However, there will be a dilemma over whether
to go for quick results in macroeconomic stability, and take the risk that they could be short-lived, or to under-
take all the necessary and often unpopular measures which will provide lasting economic stability.
This time everything should be done to bring lasting stability to prices. Thus, it is first necessary to clearly
indicate the fundamental sources of instability in the Serbian economy and to look for solutions in cooperation
with the international community.
Where should we begin?
Quick stabilization can either be exchange rate or money based. The choice between the two options will,
among other things, be the result of initial market conditions. Namely, in a situation marked by high price insta-
bility with full dollarization, the chances to implement a form of exchange rate based stabilization program are
greater. On the other hand, in a situation of high inflation, but not hyperinflation, it is possible to implement the
stabilization program with the supply of money serving as a nominal anchor. 
In any case it is necessary to give priority to redressing the fiscal deficit. The fiscal deficit is the most difficult
political and economic issue in the country and its solution will determine the outcome of the whole stabiliza-
tion program. The above-mentioned stabilization programs of 1990 and 1994 both faltered on exactly that issue.
In addition, the hyperinflation of 1992-93 was the result of fiscal deficit monetization. The fiscal deficit is expect-
ed to be the fundamental problem for the new reformist government as well.
Financing the Fiscal Deficit
The fiscal deficit is currently financed as shown in the figure below. The state first drafts its expenditures and
commits itself to financing the army or pensions in specific amounts or to maintaining the low prices in public enter-
prises (for example, electric power or petrol prices). Tax rates are determined subsequently. The tax base is pre-
dominantly related to the salaries of those employed in the private economy and social services. The tax burden of
net wages currently exceeds 100 per cent.
As fiscal revenues are insufficient to cover all expenditures there is a deficit financed either by borrowing direct-
ly from the NBY or indirectly through banks. For example, the debt of the pension fund towards pensioners was
repaid in 1999 in the form of power coupons. However, the Power Company of Serbia was financed through the
obligatory allocation of banks’ investment and a base money issue. For example, all banks are bound to have oblig-
atory reserves amounting to 17% and to keep them in the form of the NBY securities, along with an additional 7%
in the securities of the Federation and 6% of obligatory reserves in the Serbian Power CompanyÕs securities. Hence,
the banking system has practically repaid the state debt to pensioners. As the banks are illiquid, they have borrowed
from the NBY to finance these reserves. Unfortunately, the whole operation has thereby been reduced to a NBY
money issue.
The remaining deficit is simply not financed, but is converted into state debt to pensioners, employees of state
services, schoolteachers, university lecturers, etc. As the affected groups of the population keep pressuring the state,
sooner or later it will have to service its public debt by borrowing from the NBY.
From time to time new taxes are introduced, such as an additional turnover tax and duties for financing the
country’s defence in the year 2000.
This method of fiscal deficit financing leads directly or indirectly to inflation. The current regime of price con-
trols does not exclude inflation, but only temporarily suppresses and postpones it. 
Expenditures
(Exogeneously
given)
Revenues
(Endogeneously
determined)
D
ef
ic
it
Payment Arrears
on Budget
Borrowing from
the Central Bank
Increasing tax
burden
Inflation
Public Debt
Fiscal deficit is the
most difficult 
question
Rescheduling Internal Debt
A law on the rescheduling of state debts to the NBY was passed at the end of the last year. All these debts were
based on the approval of short-term credits from the base money issue and were due for repayment by the end of
the current year. However, that schedule was not met and now these short-term debts have been transformed into
long-term debt.
The above table shows the debt in dinars converted into foreign currency on the basis of the black market
exchange rate at the end of the year in which the credit had been approved. The total debt exceeds the value of
the money supply at the end of 1999, also expressed in German marks at the black market exchange rate. It demon-
strates the significance of financing the fiscal deficit by issuing money. 
Balancing the Budget
A well-balanced budget should be the new government’s goal. It is, however, impossible to achieve in the
first year. Fiscal obligations are large and fiscal revenues are very limited. If taxes were raised to a level enabling
fiscal revenues to cover all fiscal expenditures, the burden on the economy would increase dramatically, leav-
ing no funds for private investment financing. This would secure stability, but at the cost of reducing the level
of economic activity, low as it is, still further. As the unemployment rate is exceptionally high, such stability
would not be sustainable. In addition, political pressures on a new reform government should be taken into
account. Citizens will expect prompt improvements in their living standard and a drop in the unemployment
rate, not a tax increase and a drop in income.
Instead, what should be done is to follow the example of what the authorities did in 1997 when they sold 49%
of Telecom Serbia in a relatively short period. There is another part of this company and some other companies that
are also ready for sale, and potential international investors have already been identified. Unlike in 1997 these pro-
ceeds should be used for macroeconomic stabilization.
Budgets Commodity reserves Pension funds Total
FRY Serbia Montenegro Serbia Montenegro Serbia Montenegro
1994 0 196.8 24.7 226.3 13.5 0 0 460.3
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1996 0
1997 0 9.9 0.9 20.8 0 159.8 7.2 198.6
1998 0 42.6 0 0 0 81.2 8.2 132.0
1999 39.2 0 0 0 0 22.6 0 61.8
Total 39.2 248.3 25.6 247.1 13.5 263.6 15.4 852.7
Financing the Fiscal and Quasi Fiscal Deficit by Issuing Base Money
(DM millions)
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It is impossible to
balance the budget
in the first year
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Reconstruct the
pension system
On the fiscal side, a stabilization fund should be established to cover budgetary deficits in pension
funds and for restructuring the army and the police. The suggestion made by Dragoslav Avramovi to sup-
port the pensioners whose incomes are below the minimal living standard is justified both from humani-
tarian and fiscal perspectives, as it buys time to assess the efficiency of the whole retirement insurance
system. Furthermore, a program should be introduced to support stability in the region based on demili-
tarizing a part of the Yugoslav army and police forces. This program will cost a lot, but will lead to a much
higher reduction of public (military) expenditures in a later stage.
Reform the System of Fiscal Management
Fiscal reform must include the creation of a consolidated balance of public finances and the intro-
duction of a treasury as a new institution for the improved management of public revenues and expendi-
tures. 
A consolidated balance of public finances is necessary because of the federal and decentralized bud-
get systems (federation, two republics, two, but actually, one province and about 200 towns and munici-
palities). There are also many quasi-fiscal institutions such as pension and other social security funds, state
enterprises and commodity reserve funds. Fiscal and quasi-fiscal accounts should be pegged together and
their mutual debts should be excluded in order to determine the amount of the public deficit in a trans-
parent manner.
At this moment these accounts are not connected, and there is no clear evidence of public expendi-
tures or coordinated management of the state budget or of the various fundsÕ liquidity. Hence, there are
problems with liquidity, which are currently resolved through increased borrowing from the NBY or by
increasing unpaid obligations, rather than through the better management of state revenues and expendi-
tures.
Another set of measures relates to the legalization of the shadow economy, which comprises 25-35%
of GDP, according to some estimates. By enabling easy business registration and modest tax payments, a
significant portion of the shadow economy would be transferred into legal channels of trade and produc-
tion. Parallel to that, the value-added tax should be introduced along with the complete array of accom-
panying documentation to drastically reduce tax evasion and activities in the shadow zone. Further, the col-
lection of personal income tax should be more strictly enforced.
The institution of a treasury is the most important novelty in a new consolidated management of pub-
lic revenues and expenditures. It rules out the creation of extra budgetary revenues or bringing fiscal deci-
sions without parliamentary oversight. In that manner the whole fiscal process becomes more transparent
and is thereby less prone to corruption.
Revise Fiscal Expenditures 
Naturally, a reassessment of the current fiscal expenditures is also necessary. Certain savings are also
possible. However, the real level of incomes in the sectors of education, health, and state services is so low
that large savings are almost impossible.
There are two groups of fiscal expenditures that deserve special attention. The first are military and
police expenditures. At their current level they exceed the usual European standards. It would be naive to
believe that they can simply be reduced to a sustainable level overnight. After ten years of wars and con-
flicts in the former Yugoslavia there is a huge police and army apparatus. Redundancies cannot simply be
thrown out in order to eliminate the fiscal deficit. There are strong practical restraints on that policy. One
must think about the establishment of a separate fund for restructuring the police and the army. Redundant
workers should be offered re-qualification and an opportunity to find other employment. 
The second group of quasi-fiscal deficits is related to the financing of pensions. The ratio between pen-
sioners and employed is far more unfavorable in Yugoslavia than in other countries. Minimal pensions can-
not guarantee the existential minimum. Every government should be extremely sensitive to the problems
of pensioners. Moreover, the new government would not gain voters’ support unless it had a plan of urgent
assistance to the pension funds. The permanent problem of the pension system can be resolved only
through its reconstruction in cooperation with the World Bank and with an overall economic recovery.
However, something has to be done in the first year of the new reformist government so as to leave it the
maneuvering space to solve other important tasks.
Return Frozen Currency Savings 
To meet its obligations for the repayment of frozen foreign currency savings, the state (the federation,
the two republics and the NBY) must pay DEM 6.36 billion over the next 12 years. Because of the NATO
bombing the servicing of these obligations was delayed, amounting to DEM 128 million last year. These
obligations amount to DEM 286 millions this year. This means that the servicing of frozen foreign curren-
cy savings will significantly burden all budgets.
On the other hand, there will be no renewal of public confidence in the banking system unless this
issue is resolved in a satisfactory manner. In addition to the state, the banks themselves are obliged to pay
another DEM 1.122 billion.
The law permits the sale of state property (business premises) and the appropriation of 25% of priva-
tization proceeds to service the frozen foreign currency savings. One should insist upon these sources of
financing in the future, as well as upon the replacement of foreign currency deposits with securities that
could be publicly traded even before their date of maturity.
Improve the 
management of
public accounts
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gray economy
MACROECONOMIC REVIEW
Ljubomir Madìar
Prices
The downward tendency of officially expressed price growth and living costs’ indices continued in July.  Retail
prices grew by 2.9%, after registering growth of 5.2% and 4.2% in May and June.  Living costs increased at the same
rate, 2.9%, while they were up in the two previous months by 5.7% and 3.9%.  The three-month downward ten-
dency of the growth in retail prices’ and living costs’ has followed a long upward tendency in price growth rates.
This must be considered with great reserve given the forthcoming elections, but also regardless of them.
Manipulation of statistical data has become part of a widely diversified range of other, richly differentiated manipu-
lations. That producer prices’ indices have not been published in the last several months suggests they may show
a large deviance from retail price and living costs’ indices — a fact that has become apparent even to laymen.  The
National Bank of YugoslaviaÕs failure to published facts on the amount of money in circulation, and the Payment
ServiceÕs failure to published facts on the income of the population, are equally indicative of the collapsing relia-
bility of official economic indicators.
Price control is a second fact of importance.  Due to control, officially registered inflation is smaller than that
which would be derived from the free interaction of market forces.  However, control results in accumulating and
growing inflationary pressures that incite various forms of suppressed and hidden inflation. Unabsorbed by the mar-
ket, the inner distortion transfers into overall shortages and the field of foreign trade where it manifests itself in a large
deficit.  Due to the modification of statistics and price control, total price growth in this year is considerably lower
than what could have been expected. In July of this year relative to December of last year, retail prices grew by 23.0%
and living costs were up by 24.6%, while year on year, retail prices grew by 58.4% and living costs by 76.0%.  
Comparing data that relate to different intervals reveals the persistence of inflation, deeply-rooted in the very
fundaments of the Yugoslav economy.  Thus prices in the first seven months of the year 2000 grew by 40.8% rela-
tive to their average growth in 1999, while compared to the same period of last year they grew by 58.7%. However,
the level of retail prices in July rose year on year by a whole 68.4%.  An analogous configuration of growth rates is
expressed with living costs as well.  
The constellation of officially presented inflation rates is interesting and highly suggestive.  Because it introduced
a dual-currency system, Montenegro faced serious difficulties in adapting and administering a totally unconventional
transition regime.  Despite the introduction of the DEM as a parallel currency, the first months brought remarkably high
inflation rates.  For example, retail prices in Montenegro were up by 141.6% in the first 7 months of this year relative
to the same period last year, while in Serbia retail prices were up "only" 54.3%.  Initial adaptations are at their end and
no longer produce significant inflation.  Montenegro has a smaller chain price growth rate month on month than Serbia:
2.9% in Serbia for retail prices, 2.0% in Montenegro. For living costs the corresponding rates are 3.2% and 1.3%.  
Production
Production indices, when observed out of a wide time and development context, depict the usual image of very
dynamic growth.  In the first seven months of this year, the index of the total scope of industrial production was
up by 20% year on year.  The monthly index is even more impressive - only at first glance - as in July it was 24.3%
over the level of July 1999.  It has become reprehensible, but not redundant in the least, to pinpoint that the "secret"
of such high growth indicators is contained in an extremely low basis resulting from the bombing and concomitant
paralysis of economy.  When an average index for the whole of 1999 is taken into account, it reveals a downward
tendency that is illustrative of a basic and determinative downward trend beginning in mid-1998.  Calculated in this
way, the industrial production index amounts to 110.8 for the first seven months of this year, and 106.8 for July
(1999 average=100).
A series of deseasoned indices (1999 average=100) illustrates the same phenomenon in a slightly different way,
showing industrial production growth in the first four months of 2000, and stagnation at the level of around 120%
since that time.  The deseasoned index for July shows a certain decrease relative to June, falling from 120.5 to
120.3%.  This picture is supplemented and highlighted by noting that industrial production in July fell by 5.3% month
on month.  As for industrial sectors, i.e. among the eight groups of industrial branches depicted in official statistics,
it can be noted that electric power, steel-production and some other industrial sectors register above-average growth.
The production of food and tobacco registered the lowest index (79.2%), followed by textile, leather and rubber
production, and the metal-processing and electric
power industries (the corresponding indices are 87.5
and 87.9).  The latter index is somewhat surprising with
regard to the widely publicized reconstruction cam-
paign, which should have - if it really moves a great
amount of resources, and with the positive and notori-
ous balance of payment restrictions in mind - strongly
incited production especially in this sector.  
There are significant differences between industrial
production indices for Serbia and Montenegro.  When
the first seven months of 2000 are observed and com-
pared to the same period in 1999, the Montenegrin
index is a lot less than the one for Serbia — 101.0 to
121.8.  This would, on one hand, illustrate the potential
that Montenegrin industrial complexes suffered less
damage during the NATO bombing than Serbian ones
(that hypothesis would require proof), while on the
other hand it could also indicate the effects of the
Serbian economic blockade towards Montenegro.  It is
interesting, however, that the current index for
Montenegro (July : June 2000) is much larger: 114.4
which denotes much livelier current industrial growth
dynamics than that of Serbia, whose index of 93.5 is
taking on regressive traits
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FRY Balance of Trade
The reliability of
official economic
indicators is 
collapsing
Foreign trade flows
The most conspicuous characteristic of Yugoslav foreign trade is the enormous foreign trade deficit.  That
deficit has constantly piled up over the past ten years, with the coverage of exports by imports typically mov-
ing at around one half.  According to conservative estimates, in this troublesome and turbulent decade the
accumulated trade deficit has reached some 15 billion USD.  How the deficit was covered was long consid-
ered to be a sort of unsolvable mystery.  Even a corresponding neologism was assigned - unidentifiable
financial sources.  The mystery is gradually resolved and now it is clear that the population’s foreign cur-
rency reserves represent the main source for financing the deficit.  Households (are forced to) supplement
their expenditure by activating foreign currency savings.  It is only natural that this kind of a financial source
results in a large surplus of imports over exports.  Further, export revenues are not fully registered and a
large portion does not even enter the country.  The enormous discrepancy between market and official for-
eign currency exchange rates can hardly result in any enthusiasm, or discipline, with regard to repatriating
foreign currency. 
Movements registered during the first seven months of this year dramatically illustrate and confirm the
deep-rooted and structurally conditioned discrepancy between import and export.  Export grew by 15.6%
January to July relative to the first seven months of the previous year.  Import growth is much greater and
amounted to 31.4% in the first seven months year on year.  Both indices reflect the extremely low basis of
last year, but their difference is indicative and forewarning.  Imports amounted to 2,203 million USD in the
same period, while exports amounted to only 986 million USD.  Regarding the scope of exchange, the trade
deficit registered at an unusually high level of 1,217 million USD.  Coverage of imports by exports fell well
below one half and remained at a level of only 44.8%.  Although similar to those for Yugoslavia, figures for
Serbia are slightly worse.  In the observed seven-month period, imports reached 1,986 million USD, exports
reached 877 million USD, and the corresponding deficit was 1,109 million USD.  Coverage of imports by
exports fell to 44.2%.  Compared to the corresponding period last year, imports increased by 35.7% and
exports increased by 12.3%.  During that time interval, Montenegro exported 109 million UDS worth of com-
modities, and imported 217 million USD worth.  Exports covered imports by 50.2%.  Monthly figures are a bit
more favorable than the considered seven-month sums.  In July, FRY exports amounted to 151 million USD
(growth of 20.6%), while imports amounted to 242 million USD (decline of 6.2%).  The coverage of imports
by exports rose to 62.4% in July.  Apart from usual short-term fluctuations, the shortage of foreign currency
for paying imports could have contributed to this result.
In the past year the market foreign currency exchange rate grew much faster than both retail prices and
living costs.  Relative to July 1999, the market rate increased by 109.8%, while retail prices grew by 68.4%,
and living costs grew by 76.0% in the same period.  Observed through the market exchange rate, the dinar
has depreciated notably as compared to the year before.  The same can be said with an independent obser-
vation of July, when the market exchange rate increased by 2.9% while officially registered living costs and
retail prices grew by 2.8%.  It can thereby be concluded that July brought additional depreciation.
Monetary policy
Yugoslavia has been functioning on a dual currency system for quite a while.  There is no essential differ-
ence between Serbia and Montenegro in that respect.  The only difference is that Montenegro has made this
obvious fact of life official, while Serbia has not (yet).  Differences connected to the official status of the German
mark are not wide in character, and it can be maintained that the unity of the Yugoslav monetary system has
not been disrupted in principle.  
Estimates of household foreign currency reserves move within the wide scope of 2 to 7 billion DEM.  The
quantity of that large reserve of wealth that becomes activated in transactions and adds to the money mass,
as well as the passive part of it that households guard for unpredictable and urgent needs or for planned
financing of large transactions remains unknown and cannot be discovered.  This is the reason behind why
official data on the (dinar) money mass cannot be interpreted as a measure of liquidity in the economy and
especially not as a measure of liquidity in society as a whole.  
All this stands for both households and the part of economy that disposes of hidden foreign currency
reserves.  Due to the defective, collectivistic-formed basis of property, means from both the social and state
sector are undergoing intensive erosion.  The state and social part of the economy leaks liquidity on all sides
and ever since the long gone times of self-management it has been insolvent. The money mass reached an
amazing 22.5 billion dinars by the end of July, with
an impressive 8 billion dinars (35.6%) of cash.  The
market exchange rate for July was estimated at 23.7
dinars in the Economic Review, suggesting almost
950 million DEM worth of money mass.  This is an
extremely low level of monetization by international
standards.  
Monetary policy remains in a position that is so
typically described in Greek tragedy: either the econ-
omy gets permeated by additional credits at the cost
of surging already dangerous inflationary tendencies,
or credit taps dry out in an attempt to defend the
dinar, producing a total obstruction of economic activ-
ity in many segments due to a shortages of money to
cover the next production cycle.  Recently the crisis
got worse even while the money mass grew rapidly.
Namely, uncontrolled issue increased the amount of
money from 18.7 billion dinars in May to 22.5 billion
in July, or a whole 20.3%.  The annual equivalent for
this two-month rate is no less than 203.4%, which sur-
passes all permissible limits and is a rare occurrence
in the international environment, but strongly reflects
the destructive chaos into which the whole of our eco-
nomic policy has hopelessly fallen.
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